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Abstract. In a setting where heterogeneous agents interact to accom-
plish a given set of goals, cooperation is of utmost importance, especially
when agents cannot achieve their individual goals by exclusive use of
their own efforts [1]. Even when we consider friendly environments and
benevolent agents, cooperation involves several issues: with whom to co-
operate, reciprocation, how to address credit assignment and complex
division of gains, etc.
We propose a model where heterogeneous agents cooperate by forming
groups and formation of larger groups is promoted. Benefit of agents is
proportional to the performance and the size of the group. There is a
time pressure to form a group. We investigate how preferring similar or
complement agents in group formation affects an agent’s success. Prefer-
ring complement in group formation is found to be better, yet there is
no need to push the strategy to the extreme since the effect of comple-
menting partners is saturated.
1 Introduction
In a setting where heterogeneous agents interact to accomplish a given set
of goals, cooperation is of utmost importance, especially when agents cannot
achieve their individual goals by exclusive use of their own efforts [1]. Even when
we consider friendly environments and benevolent agents, cooperation involves
several issues: with whom to cooperate, reciprocation, how to address credit as-
signment and complex division of gains, etc. Since we consider heterogeneous
agents, one of the problems for an agent that considers to engage into coopera-
tion is to decide a rule for choosing partners. Agents might prefer to cooperate
with agents similar to themselves, or might prefer agents that are completely
dissimilar from them, or they might even for groups composed of a mixture of
several agent types.
Time is an important element of decision of who to cooperate. Given infinite
time, one wants to get the perfect match. But if there is a time pressure, one
makes the decision on what ever is available. Although one rejects an offer of a
cooperation from a group at one time, the very same agent may accept the offer
of the same group later in time.
One can also decide whom to interact and cooperate with by considering the
trustworthiness of others. One of the most well known examples is Axelrod’s
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [2]. Axelrod shows that the tit-for-tat strategy (co-
operate in the first round, and do whatever the other agent does in the rest of
the game) is the best within a controlled settings. But tit-for-tat is not the best
strategy when one is playing with a selfish, hence a non-cooperative another one.
In order to minimize losses, an adaptive trust strategy model is proposed by Wu
and Sun [3].
Riolo, using the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma studies cooperation [4] to show
that tag mechanisms in the emergency of mutual cooperation is very useful.
Edmonds also studies cooperation in symbiotic groups using agents with tags.
In this model [5], agents who are able cooperate and form groups symbiotic
groups can survive, because agents need all types of resources to survive but
can only harvest one type of resource. But all groups are prone to invasion of
selfish agents. Agents can cooperate only to others with close tag values, but the
one among the close agents is selected randomly. In both models agents have no
explicit preferences to select whom to cooperate. On the other hand, S. M. Deen
and R. Jayousi assume knowledge of possible solutions and assume preferences
among them [6]. They setup a multiagent system in which each agent has its
own preferences and those preferences may conflict. So they process preferences
to match as much preferences as possible globally.
In this study agents form groups to harvest fields. At the end of harvesting
members of the groups get some payoff from the amount they collected and
groups dissolve. This process repeats itself. The simulation is composed of terms.
A term is composed of T + 4 time units. What happens in one term briefly is:
– At t = 0, among population k of individuals are selected to form groups as
group initiators. Each agent consumes a constant amount of food.
– At t = 1 to t = T , group initiators try to form their groups within T time
units. At each time unit each group initiator makes an offer to an agent
that is not yet joined to a group. Note that if all the offers are granted, the
maximum group size would be T + 1.
– At t = T + 1, each group is assigned a field whose size is less then the total
capacity of the group. While the group harvest the field, the reliability and
efficiency of the agents take place.
– At t = T + 2, the collected food is shared. Agents in larger groups get
better payoff. Therefore formation of larger groups is promoted. Friendship
networks are updated according to the members of each group.
– At t = T + 3, all groups are dissolved. Group initiators are unassigned.
– After these time steps the next term starts.
In the rest of this paper, we explain parameters of an agent in Section 2. In
Section 3 we describe one term in a simulation in detail and we explain how an
offer is done and evaluated by agents. In Section 4 we describe different possible
strategies an agent can have in choosing with whom to cooperate. The simulation
setup is explained in Section 5. We give and discuss our results in Section 6.
2 Model Setup
The model is driven by this main assumption that there are many fields of
different sizes such that individuals require to form groups in order to be able to
harvest a field, even to harvest the field with the smallest size. In addition, it is
assumed that groups do not need to compete for the same field, because there are
many fields which are exactly the same. Thus individuals need to select partners
to be in the same group among their friends (Each individual has friends which
is a set of other individuals). Thus, the necessity to be in a group to be able
to harvest food is the basic assumption. The environment is closed (there is no
reproduction) on which we show that the preferences on selecting or forming a
group, cooperation, affects the amount of food an individual can harvest. The
simulation consists of time steps in which individuals go into groups, consume
some food and may die if there is no food to consume.
Each agent has its
– capacity, ci, which is taken a constant, c0 is this study;
– reliability and efficiency vector bi = [b
r
i b
e
i ]
τ where both bri and b
e
i come from
a random uniform distribution, U(0, 1) and τ is the transpose operation;
– preference vector pi = p
r
ip
e
i where p
r
i and p
e
i ∈ [0, 1] and p
r
i + p
e
i = 1;
– savings of agent ai at time t, si(t);
– and a dynamic friend network of agent ai at time t, Fi(t).
Population consists of n agents, and no new agents are added to the popula-
tion during the simulation. In each term k of n agents are randomly selected to
form groups, where k < n. Fields are unlimited resources. Each group is assigned
a field proportional to its size. We describe all of these parameters in more detail
in section 3.
3 Dynamics of one Term
A term consists of T+4 time units. At time t = 0, in each term k of n agents, the
population, are randomly selected as the group initiators. The k group initiators
are responsible for forming groups in a limited time.
3.1 Forming Groups
There is T time units to form a group. The goal is to try to form a group with as
large total capacity as possible. The group initiator has to have some tradeoff:
It has to form the group within a given time and it wants to form that group
based on its taste, that is vector pi.
Since each agent has a fixed and constant capacity of c0 the largest group
has also the largest capacity. At one unit time the initiator can make one offer
to an agent. Since given T time units, the maximum group size can be T + 1.
The agent aj , who gets the offer may accept or reject the offer whose dynamics
will be given later. The important point at this time is that similar to the group
initiator, the agent who gets the offer has also T time units to join a group. So
it also has time pressure on it.
Making the Offer Each group initiator, agent ai, evaluates all friends in its
friend network according to its preference vector, pi. If one of friends, agent aj
has vector bj = [b
r
jb
e
j ]
τ and the group initiator has preference vector pi = [p
r
ip
e
i ]
then the metric for aj is vij =
[
pri p
e
i
] [brj
bej
]
= pτi bj . Then for agent ai probability
of selecting agent aj is given as
v
γ
ij∑
k∈Fi
v
γ
ik
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Fig. 1. Effect of γ
Note that vij ∈ [0, 1] and consider γ power of vij , that is e
γ
ij . In Fig. 1, there
are agents a1, a2 and a3. For γ = 1, a3 will be selected instead of a2. For γ > 1,
the selection of a3 becomes much cleaner, whereas for γ < 1 the difference of
a2 and a3 decreases. In the extreme case γ = 0, the selection of a1, a2 and
a3 become the same. On the other hand, as γ increases selection of a1 and a2
become close to each other and a3 becomes more apart.
We use the effect of γ for choosiness. Although initially a3 is very likely to
get the offer, as time pressure increases, a2 becomes considerable for the group.
If time pressure is so high, even a1 is also considered.
Let
γ = γ0
T − t+ |G(t)|
T
where t ∈ 1, ..., T is the time, and T is the allowed time for group formation.
|Gi(t)| is the size of the group i at time t. We take γ0 = 3 due to a similar model
proposed by French and Kus in [7].
At t = 0, γ is high. As t increases, the remaining time to form a group
decreases. Then the pool of potential partners must be increased. This can be
done by lowering γ. So that even a1 in Figure 1 can get a chance.
On the other hand, group size has the opposite effect. If group is large enough,
it may not get a new agent that does not fit. But if the size is not large enough,
obtaining a new agent should be promoted. Hence if the group size is low, γ
should be low, but if it is high, γ need not be small.
Evaluating the Offer Agent evaluates the offer it gets based on all the offers
it so far got. It considers the time pressure. This time choosiness is defined as
ln(γ T−t
T
).
An offer received from a group is evaluated based on the agents in the group
that makes the offer. A vector which contains the mean of the reliability and
that of efficiency is taken as the parameters of the group,
bGi(t) =
[
br
Gi(t)
be
Gi(t)
]
Similar to the what group initiators do,
oji(t) = b
T
Gi(t)
pj
is calculated, which is the offer received by agent aj at time t from group i in a
given term. The time pressure effect is included as
o
′
ji(t) = oji(t) + ln(γ0
T − t
T
)
where o
′
ij(t) is the adjusted value. The agent calculates the mean µ and standard
deviation σ of all the previous offers. If the adjusted value is larger than µ−1.5σ
then the offer is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. Agent aj who received the
offer, updates its µ and σ for each offer it received.
Note that even if the group who made the offer is exactly the same, an agent
may accept their second offer due to time pressure.
3.2 Harvesting
After group formation, that t = T + 1, a field is assigned to each group of size
greater than 1 which means in order to be assigned a field, the group should have
at least two members. We assume that fields are not critical resources. Every
group is assigned a field that is slightly less than the total capacity of the group.
Since we assume that capacity of agents are the same, c0, the size of the assigned
field is as follows:
Cf = |G|c0 − |N(0, |G|)|
where N(0, |G|) is a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance |G|, and |G|
is the size of the group. As the size of the group increases, fluctuation of the field
size also increases.
After group gets its field to harvest, every agent in the group harvest the
field. An agent aj has capacity c0, reliability b
r
j and efficiency b
e
j . The amount it
collects is given as:
Aj =
{
c0 with probability b
r
j
c0 − |N(0, 2)| with probability 1− b
r
j
Since agents are not efficient, the net amount is given as
Anj = Ajb
e
j
3.3 Sharing The Collected and Friend Network Updates
Since agent is in a group the amount it gets is proportional to its contribution
to the group. In the case of single group, agent aj gets
Anj
Aj∑
k∈Gj
Ak
where Gj is the group agent aj belongs to. Since there are many groups and we
want to favor larger group sizes, the actual award agent aj gets is:
∆Aj = A
n
j
Aj∑
k∈Gj
Ak
(
1 +
|Gj |
|Gmax|
)
where Gj is the group aj belongs to, Gmax is the largest possible group. The net
gain ∆Aj is added to the savings sj of aj .
If agents cannot gather all the field, because of they are not reliable enough,
which means
∑
k∈Gj
Ak < Cf , although they receive award for the amount of
field they collected, they receive punishment for the remaining. The amount of
punishment is evaluated using net amount collected by each agent. Each agent
gets equal payoffs from the total punishment. The punishment agent aj receives
is as follows:
1
|Gj |

Cf − ∑
k∈Gj
Ank
(
1 +
|Gj |
|Gmax|
)
where Gj is the group aj belongs to, Gmax is the largest possible group. The
savings sj of aj is decreased that much.
In each group, if there are pairs of agents which are not friends currently,
these pairs may become friends. Such pairs occur when two agents are friends
of the same group initiator, but they are not friends of each other. If there is
such a pair in the group, each agent in such a pair firstly evaluates the value of
the friend candidate using its preference vector, p. That agent also evaluates its
current friends again by its preference vector, p. If the value of candidate agent
is acceptable when compared to the current friends, the candidate is accepted,
otherwise it is rejected. If both agents in the pair accept each other, then they
become friends. Similar mechanism described in section 3.1 is used to decide
whether accept the candidate or reject it.
At the end of this term, at t = T + 3, friendship network us updated as
explained above. Cooperations (groups) resolve at the end of the term. A new
term starts.
4 Prefer the Similar or the Complement
An agent, using its preference vector p, may prefer one individual to another or
one group to another. Here we divide these preferences agents can have into two:
1) Similar Preferring, 2) Complement Preferring. Assume agent aj has reliability
and efficiency vector bj = [b
r
jb
e
j ] and preference vector pj = [p
r
jp
e
j ]. If aj is a
similar preferring then it satisfies one of the following:
prj > p
e
j if b
r
j > b
e
j
prj < p
e
j if b
r
j < b
e
j
On the other hand, if aj is complement preferring then it satisfies one of the
following:
prj > p
e
j if b
r
j < b
e
j
prj < p
e
j if b
r
j > b
e
j
An agent may prefer some level of similarity or complementarity. This de-
pends on its preference vector pj. If p
r
j and p
e
j are close then it prefers agents
whose reliability, brj and efficiency, b
e
j are close. Similarly, if agent has p
r
j and
pej values far away, then it prefers the ones with reliability, b
r
j and efficiency, b
e
j
apart. We use the parameter α to manage how apart prj and p
r
j values of a pref-
erence vector pj will be. Take an agent aj who is complement preferring agent
with bj = [b
r
jb
e
j ] and b
r
j > b
r
j . Here is how we calculate preference vector, pj:
prj =
bej
brj + b
e
j
− (1− brj)α
pej =
brj
brj + b
e
j
+ (1 + brj)α
where α to manage affect distance between preference on reliability, prj and
preference on efficiency, prj . Note that p
r
j + p
e
j = 1. The calculation is similar
when brj < b
e
j or when the agent is a similar preferring agent.
The percentage of individuals that are complement preferring is again a pa-
rameter in the model, β.
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Fig. 2. Average food balance of individuals which prefer complement and which
prefer similar in 1 run
5 Simulation Setup
The parameter setting of the simulations is as follows: The initial population
size, n is 200, the maximum number of terms in one simulation, maxTerm is
1000, the number of group initiators in each term, k is 40, the amount of initial
food each agent has, si(0) is 200, and the length of period of group formation,
T is 8. For simplicity, capacity of each agent is the same and set to 10.
In Fig. 2, the value of the parameter α is 1, individuals prefer extremes.
Percentage of complement preferring individuals, β is 50% in the population.
The amount of food an agent consumes in one simulation step is 4. The reason
of decline in food balances in the beginning of the simulation is the sizes of
friend networks of each individual is small in the beginning, hence they cannot
form groups efficiently. But after the decline, we see that complement preferring
agents achieve a higher food balance on the average when compared to the similar
preferring agents.
In Fig. 3, the amount of food an agent consumes in one simulation step,
ConsumptionAmount is 2. We run simulations for 45 different configurations: 5
different values of α, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0 and 9 different values of percentage
of complement agents, β, 10%, 20%, ..., 90%. For each configuration, we did 800
replications over simulation runs of 1000 terms. Hence the values on the Y axis
are the percentage of simulations in which complement preferring agents make
more food balance than similar preferring agents. Since standard deviation is
very small we ignore variance in our results.
6 Conclusion
We use the mate choice model introduced by French and Kus in [7] with some
changes. Group formation is actually a mate choice problem. In our model one
agent is selecting many mates, partners, not one agent as in the mate choice
problem. An agent who receives an offer should then consider all other partners
in addition to the offer making agent which is the group initiator. In this study
we make a description of that modified mate choice model, the group formation
model in detail.
In Fig. 3, we see that for all values of α average number of times comple-
ment agents make more food balance decrease when percentage of complement
preferring agents increase. Hence, if a small sub-population is complement then
they achieve really better. This result is intuitive, since a small part of the popu-
lation prefers the complementing partners, they are able to achieve cooperating
with the complements. But when most of the agents want to cooperate with
complements, complement for each agent may not be available.
Secondly, for larger α, we have better results, which implies that cooperating
with more complement agents is better. But it does not change further after α
is 0.6. There is no need to push the strategy to the extreme since the effect of
complementing partners is saturated after α exceeds 0.6.
Actually our findings are in compliance with that of [8] in which Cowan
and Jonard show that the diffusion of knowledge is best achieved when 10% of
Fig. 3. Average number of times average food balances of complement preferring
agents are higher than that of similar preferring agents over 800 runs for each
45 different configurations
the nodes in a group has weak links. In our study, we show that if 10% of the
population (set of all nodes in knowledge diffusion study) is complement prefer-
ring (has weak links) then they achieve the best depending on how complement
agents (weak links) they are preferring.
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